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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. Introduction 
 The District Court dismissed Joe Kannikal’s suit 
against his former employer, the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, as untimely based on the six-year statute of 
limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).  The parties 
initially framed their arguments assuming the applicability of 
this limitation but, at our urging, have addressed whether this 
limitation should apply.  We conclude that the dismissal 
cannot stand, as the six-year statute of limitations contained 
in § 2401(a) does not apply to suits brought under Title VII, 
and Kannikal’s suit was timely.  The Government also makes 
an additional argument in support of the dismissal, namely 
that Kannikal waived the right to sue.  We disagree.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order and 
remand for further proceedings in the District Court.1   
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 




 The Bureau of Prisons terminated Kannikal on 
September 3, 1999.  On April 20, 2001, Kannikal filed a 
formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), but he did not receive an 
administrative hearing until 2006.  Kannikal’s case was then 
held in abeyance because it was considered part of a pending 
class action complaint.  In 2007, the Department of Justice 
informed Kannikal that his case would no longer be held in 
abeyance and suggested that he contact the EEOC.  Kannikal 
asked the EEOC about his case status in 2008 and 2009, but 
he never received a response, let alone a final decision.  He 
filed this civil action on March 28, 2012.   
 
 The Government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that § 2401(a) barred this 
action because over six years had passed since Kannikal’s 
cause of action accrued.  Section 2401(a) provides that “every 
civil action commenced against the United States shall be 
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the 
right of action first accrues.”  28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).  Under 
Title VII, a claimant may file suit 180 days after filing the 
initial charge.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).  The District Court 
held that Kannikal’s cause of action accrued on October 17, 
2001, i.e., 180 days after he filed his EEOC complaint, and 
expired six years later based on § 2401(a).  It ruled that it 
would not apply the equitable tolling principles that Kannikal 
sought because § 2401(a) represents a limited waiver of the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity and courts cannot 
expand that waiver.  Therefore, it did not consider whether 
equitable tolling would otherwise have been warranted on the 




 On appeal, we questioned the parties’ assumption that 
a general six-year limit would apply, notwithstanding Title 
VII’s specific scheme regarding the timing of civil actions, 
and we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on 
this issue.   
 
 Kannikal argues that applying § 2401(a) would 
undermine Title VII’s administrative process by forcing 
claimants to abandon the administrative process when the six-
year deadline approaches.  He also asserts that the more 
specific statute, namely Title VII, should prevail over the 
more general statute, i.e., § 2401(a).  The Government argues 
that Kannikal waived this issue by failing to raise it before the 
District Court or in his opening brief.  The Government also 
urges that § 2401(a) should apply because its language 
encompasses every civil action commenced against the 
United States; this Court cannot expand the waiver of 
sovereign immunity in § 2401(a); § 2401(a) and Title VII do 
not conflict; and there must be an outer limit on how long a 
claimant can engage in the administrative process before 
losing his right to file suit.   
III. Whether § 2401(a) Applies 
 We first address our ability to have raised, sua sponte, 
the issue of whether § 2401(a) applies to Title VII.  The 
Government argues that we need not address this argument 
because Kannikal waived it.  We disagree.  “It is appropriate 
for us to reach an issue that the district court did not if ‘the 
issues provide purely legal questions, upon which an 
appellate court exercises plenary review.’”  N.J. Carpenters v. 
Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 
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2014) (quoting Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. 
Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998)).  No court of 
appeals has ever applied § 2401(a) to bar a civil action under 
Title VII,2 and we will not refuse to address this issue on the 
basis of waiver.  “[I]t is within our discretion to consider an 
issue that the parties did not raise below.” Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 
2013); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) 
(“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved 
for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the 
discretion of the courts of appeals . . . .”).  While it is true that 
ordinarily an appellate court will not consider an issue that 
was not raised below, that practice exists so that “parties may 
have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe 
relevant” and so that “litigants may not be surprised on appeal 
by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no 
opportunity to introduce evidence.”  Hormel v. Helvering, 
312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941).  In this case, however, we address 
an important issue regarding the interplay between two 
statutory provisions, not a matter implicating the introduction 
of evidence.  Furthermore, we ordered two rounds of 
supplemental briefing and discussed this issue extensively at 
oral argument, thus giving the parties ample opportunity to 
present their positions.   
                                              
2 With this Opinion, we align ourselves with the only other 
appeals court to consider this issue, the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, which recently held that “28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(a) does not apply to Title VII civil actions brought by 
federal employees.”  Howard v. Pritzker, Nos. 12-5370, 12-





 Our analysis must begin with the text of Title VII.  
Title VII has a detailed, specific provision regarding the 
limitation of actions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).  It states:  
 
Within 90 days of receipt of notice of 
final action taken by a department, 
agency, or unit . . . or by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
upon an appeal from a decision or order 
of such department, agency, or unit on a 
complaint of discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin . . . or after one hundred and 
eighty days from the filing of the initial 
charge with the department, agency, or 
unit or with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission on appeal from 
a decision or order of such department, 
agency, or unit until such time as final 
action may be taken by a department, 
agency, or unit, an employee or applicant 
for employment, if aggrieved by the final 
disposition of his complaint, or by the 
failure to take final action on his 
complaint, may file a civil action . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).  This scheme sets forth a specific 
starting point—namely, that a claimant may file suit 180 days 
after filing his initial charge.  It also sets a specific outer 
limit—namely, that a claimant has 90 days in which to file 
suit after receiving a final agency decision.  Here, there was 
no final agency decision, so the 90-day period was never 
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activated.  Thus, the real issue is whether there is a limit as to 
how long a claimant can await the conclusion of the 
administrative process before filing suit.  The statute provides 
no such limit.  Section 2000e-16(c) specifically provides that 
“after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the 
initial charge . . . until such time as final action may be 
taken . . . , an employee . . . , if aggrieved . . . by the failure to 
take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (emphasis added).  It permits an 
aggrieved party to file suit any time after 180 days have 
passed until there is a final decision.  The final decision then 
triggers the 90-day outer limit.  
 
 The specificity of Title VII’s limitations scheme 
convinces us that § 2401(a) does not apply.  “[I]t is a 
commonplace of statutory construction that the specific 
governs the general . . . .”  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).  “That is particularly true 
where . . . ‘Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme 
and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific 
solutions.’”  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated 
Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) (quoting Varity Corp. v. 
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 519 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).  
The specific limitation period here is 90 days after the agency 
issues a final decision.   
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed 
a similar situation in Bruno v. United States, wherein a party 
seeking a tax refund argued that § 2401(a) defined the 
relevant limitations period, rather than 26 U.S.C. § 6511, the 
statute setting forth the timeliness requirements for a tax 
refund suit.  547 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1976).  It held that 
“§ 2401 does not apply to actions for tax refunds, which are 
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governed by the more specific period of limitation set forth in 
. . . the Internal Revenue Code.”  Id.  It emphasized that “the 
general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2401 must yield to the more 
specific terms of § 6511.”  Id. at 74.  Moreover, as we 
previously held regarding Title VII, “[w]here . . . Congress 
explicitly provides a limitations period in the text of the 
statute, that period is definitive.”  Burgh v. Borough Council 
of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2001).  In Burgh, we 
held that Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations was 
inapplicable to Title VII suits because Title VII contains the 
“congressional determination of the relevant and proper time 
limitations . . . . The imposition of an additional limitations 
period is inconsistent, and indeed in direct conflict, with the 
plain language of the federal statute.”  Id.  Here, applying 
§ 2401(a) would directly conflict with Title VII’s “until such 
time” provision.  See Howard v. Pritzker, Nos. 12-5370, 12-
5392, --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 64565, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 
2015) (“[T]here is an irreconcilable conflict such that the 
specific time limits, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), trumps the 
general limitations period, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) . . . .”).   
 
 The Government argues that § 2401(a) represents a 
limited waiver of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity that we may not expand.  This argument lacks 
merit.  “[F]ederal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits 
against the United States unless Congress, via a statute, . . . 
waives the United States’ immunity to suit.”  United States v. 
Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000).  “When waiver 
legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations 
provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign 
immunity.”  Block v. N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 
461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983).  We are not expanding the 
sovereign immunity waiver in § 2401(a) because Congress 
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chose to enact 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.  In other words, the 
statute that permits employment discrimination suits against 
the federal government specifies the conditions under which 
such suits are permissible.  We are simply interpreting the 
statute of limitations, namely § 2000e-16(c), that Congress 
mandated in Title VII.  That specific statute governs, and 
§ 2401(a) is inapplicable. 
 
 The Supreme Court has emphasized that Title VII 
provides “an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and 
judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment 
discrimination.”  Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 
829 (1976) (emphasis added).  In Brown, the Supreme Court 
upheld the dismissal of a federal employee discrimination suit 
that was filed after Title VII’s deadlines expired.  It held that 
Title VII was the exclusive remedy for federal employment 
discrimination and rejected the petitioner’s argument that he 
should be able to seek relief under the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, in addition to Title 
VII.  It noted “[t]he balance, completeness, and structural 
integrity” of the 1972 amendments that incorporated relief for 
federal employees into Title VII, reasoning that those 
amendments “provide[] for a careful blend of administrative 
and judicial enforcement powers” and establish a “careful and 
thorough remedial scheme.”  Id. at 832-33.  By virtue of the 
comprehensive and distinctive nature of its remedial scheme, 
Title VII itself clearly signals that it, and not § 2401(a), 
should control.  See also Howard, 2015 WL 64565, at *8 
(“With Congress’s determination of the appropriate time 
limits in which a federal employee ‘may file a civil action,’ it 
would be, given the context, structure and purpose of Title 
VII, fundamentally inconsistent with the statutory scheme to 
impose an artificial six-year time limit.”).   
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 The legislative history of Title VII also demonstrates 
that Congress did not intend to foreclose the administrative 
process.  Indeed, Congress encouraged use of the 
administrative process, while also providing an escape valve 
from EEOC delays by permitting civil actions to be brought 
after 180 days.  The House Report for § 2000e-16 commented 
on the difficult pressures presented by the EEOC’s 
“burgeoning workload, accompanied by insufficient funds 
and a shortage of staff” and explained that “the private right 
of action . . . provides the aggrieved party a means by which 
he may be able to escape from the administrative quagmire 
which occasionally surrounds a case caught in an overloaded 
administrative process.”  H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 12 (1971).  
Congress intended to give the aggrieved party a means by 
which he may, not must, escape.  While Congress envisioned 
the civil action as an escape mechanism, there is nothing to 
suggest that it would approve of pressuring claimants to resort 
to the civil action and forego the administrative process.   
 
 The House Report acknowledged that litigation, 
whether in court or in the administrative process, is time-
consuming, and Congress expected that claimants would not 
abandon the administrative process only to encounter equally 
time consuming procedures in court:  
 
The complexity of many of the charges, 
and the time required to develop the 
cases, is well recognized by the 
committee.  It is assumed that individual 
complainants, who are apprised of the 
need for the proper preparation of a 
complex complaint involving multiple 
issues and extensive discovery 
12 
 
procedures, would not cut short the 
administrative process merely to 
encounter the same kind of delays in a 
court proceeding.  It would, however, be 
appropriate for the individual to institute 
a court action where the delay is 
occasioned by administrative 
inefficiencies.  The primary concern 
must be protection of the aggrieved 
person’s option to seek a prompt remedy 
in the best manner possible. 
 
Id. at 13.  The House Report thus reflects an awareness of the 
potential delays in the administrative process, as well as an 
assumption that complainants would allow the administrative 
process to unfold.  The “primary concern,” as noted, was the 
protection of the complainant’s right to obtain relief “in the 
best manner possible.”  Id. 
 
 The Senate Committee similarly explained that “the 
committee believes that the aggrieved person should be given 
an opportunity to escape the administrative process when he 
feels his claim has not been given adequate attention” and 
that “[t]he primary concern should be to protect the aggrieved 
person’s option to seek a prompt remedy.”  S. Rep. No. 92-
415, at 23-24 (1971).  An analysis presented to the Senate 
with the Conference Report emphasized that “as the 
individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the 
provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left 
open for quick and effective relief.”  118 Cong. Rec. 7168.  It 
would be incongruous, given Congress’ emphasis on 
claimants’ rights and its statement that it is “necessary” to 
leave “all avenues” open for relief, to hold that a complainant 
13 
 
is foreclosed if he is patient and awaits agency action that 
takes longer than six years.  Id.   
 
 We cannot imagine that Congress intended to penalize 
claimants for EEOC delays.  Applying § 2401(a) would do 
just that.  If, after awaiting a final agency decision for 180 
days plus six years, a claimant no can longer bring suit, then 
he would be barred from relief.  This case proves the point: 
the problematic delays, whereby the EEOC did not respond to 
Kannikal’s inquiries and did not provide a final decision, 
occurred after six years had passed.3  Thus, we conclude that 
applying § 2401(a) to Title VII actions is inconsistent with 
Congress’ intent.  
 
 The Supreme Court’s analysis of Title VII’s legislative 
history further confirms our view.  Congress prioritized 
claimants’ rights by “afford[ing] an aggrieved person the 
option of withdrawing his case from the EEOC if he was 
dissatisfied with the rate at which his charge was being 
processed.”  Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. E.E.O.C., 432 
U.S. 355, 362 (1977).4  In Occidental, the EEOC sued a 
                                              
3 Kannikal provided several hypothetical examples of the 
perversity of applying § 2401(a).  For example, a claimant 
may receive a favorable decision from an administrative 
judge close to the six-year mark.  If he waits to see whether 
the agency will implement the favorable decision, then he 
risks losing his right to seek recourse in court.  If he goes to 
court, however, then he must abandon the favorable decision.  
 
4 Occidental addressed a private-employer, not a federal-
employer, case; however, because both the statutes of 
limitation that apply to private- and public-employers permit 
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private employer, who argued that the suit was untimely.  The 
employer urged that the EEOC was barred from bringing an 
enforcement suit by not doing so within 180 days after the 
employee filed the charge.  Reading the relevant provision of 
Title VII carefully, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the 180-day 
period set forth in the statute was not a limitation, but, rather, 
was a time period after which the complainant could elect to 
seek relief through a private enforcement action.  It held that 
the 180-days provision means that “[i]f a complainant is 
dissatisfied with the progress the EEOC is making on his or 
her charge of employment discrimination, he or she may elect 
to circumvent the EEOC procedures and seek relief through a 
private enforcement action in a district court.”  Id. at 361.   
 
 The Supreme Court concluded that “final and 
conclusive confirmation of the meaning” of the 180-days 
provision was in the analysis presented to the Senate with the 
Conference Report stating that the private right of action “‘is 
designed to make sure that the person aggrieved does not 
                                                                                                     
claimants to file suit after 180 days, it is apposite.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Government argues that our 
holding is “particularly anomalous” because “Title VII 
provisions governing private sector claims allow employees 
only 90 days to file suit in district court after receiving notice 
that the EEOC has decided not to pursue the administrative 
charge.”  (Gov’t 1st Supp. Br. 13.)  This comparison is inapt.  
Title VII limits both private and public employees to 90 days 
to file suit after receiving notice of a decision.  Here, we 
consider whether § 2401(a) limits a public employee’s right 
to file suit before a final decision issues.   
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have to endure lengthy delays . . . . It is hoped that recourse to 
the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and 
that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through 
the . . . EEOC.’”  Id. at 365-66 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 
(1972)).  It explained that “Congressional concern over 
delays . . . was resolved by providing complainants with the 
continuing opportunity to withdraw their cases from the 
EEOC and bring private suits.”  Id. at 369 n.25 (emphasis 
added).  There is nothing to indicate that this “continuing 
opportunity” has a cut-off point.  Indeed, the concept of a 
“continuing opportunity” supports the opposite conclusion, 
i.e., that this opportunity continues until the EEOC issues a 
final decision.5  While Congress provided the complainant a 
                                              
5 We note that Congress did not list the EEOC after the “until 
such time” clause in § 2000e-16(c).  After that clause, the 
statute lists only “a department, agency, or unit,” which is 
different from the 180-days clause, which refers to 
“department, agency, or unit or . . . the EEOC.”  In other 
words, Title VII permits a claimant to file suit 180 days after 
filing the initial charge with the department, agency, unit, or 
EEOC, but the “until such time” clause refers only to final 
action taken by the department, agency, or unit.  The absence 
of the EEOC in this list may create some ambiguity as to 
whether Congress intended a different outcome for cases that 
are lingering before the EEOC.  But the legislative history is 
pellucid: Congress prioritized claimants’ rights by enabling 
them to escape administrative quagmires at the EEOC.  “In 
resolving ambiguity, we must allow ourselves some 
recognition of the existence of sheer inadvertence in the 
legislative process.”  Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 83 
(1974) (quoting Schmid v. United States, 436 F.2d 987, 992 
(Ct. Cl. 1971) (Nichols, J., dissenting)).  We conclude that the 
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way to avoid lengthy delays, it did not, on the other hand, 
express any objection to a claimant’s decision to await agency 
action.    
 
 The Government presents three specific attacks that we 
must address.  First, the Government argues that § 2401(a) 
does not preclude a claimant from seeking relief but, instead, 
simply requires a claimant to choose between the 
administrative and judicial forums when the case is 
approaching six years in the administrative process.  
However, in reality, the Government’s position would leave 
no choice at all—a claimant running up against the six-year 
limit would have to bring a civil action or be forever barred.  
The Government has not identified any language in Title VII 
or the legislative history indicating that Congress intended to 
force such an election between the two forums, let alone to 
force abandonment of the administrative process.  Congress 
“hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the 
exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of 
complaints will be handled through the . . . EEOC.”  118 
Cong. Rec. 7168; see also Burgh, 251 F.3d at 473 (“[T]he 
limitations scheme provided for in Title VII is consistent with 
Congress’s intent that most complaints be resolved through 
the EEOC rather than by private lawsuits.”).  Applying 
§ 2401(a) does not cohere with that aspiration because 
claimants would be forced to abandon the administrative 
process to preserve their judicial rights.  And they would then 
begin all over again developing the record with all its 
                                                                                                     
“until such time” provision applies to complaints lingering in 
the EEOC administrative process and the absence of EEOC 
after “until such time” was inadvertent. 
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complexities.  See Howard, 2015 WL 64565, at *8 
(Section 2401(a) does not apply to Title VII suits because 
“for employees who wished to remain on the administrative 
path, Congress set no outer time limit, choosing instead to 
provide a ninety-day window following final agency action” 
and because “[s]etting an outer time limit would reorder the 
incentives that encourage administrative resolution.”).   
 
 Thus, applying § 2401(a) is directly contrary to the 
notion, in the Title VII context, that “the court must neither 
undermine the EEOC’s capacity to investigate charges of 
discrimination, nor undercut congressional policy of favoring 
reliance by plaintiffs ‘on the administrative process of the 
EEOC.’”  Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 77 
(3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Bernard v. Gulf Oil 
Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1257 (5th Cir. 1979)).6  Applying 
§ 2401(a) would undermine the administrative process 
because most claimants would abandon the EEOC process to 
avoid § 2401(a)’s bar.  Furthermore, administrative resources 
would have been wasted during the period prior to 
abandoning the administrative process.  We therefore reject 
                                              
6 Waddell was a laches case.  It noted that “plaintiffs have 
some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and 
do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC 
proceedings where it would appear to a reasonable person that 
no administrative resolution will be forthcoming . . . .”  799 
F.2d at 77.  The issue here is simply whether § 2401(a) 
applies, and we take no position on the length of EEOC 
delays in terms of assessing the diligence element of the 




the Government’s argument that § 2401(a) requires parties to 
choose between the administrative and judicial forums.    
 
  Second, the Government argues that § 2401(a) applies 
here because it does not specifically exclude Title VII.  The 
statute provides that “[e]xcept as provided by chapter 71 of 
title 41, every civil action commenced against the United 
States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six 
years . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).  Section 2401(a) thus has 
only one explicit exception, and that is “chapter 71 of title 
41,” which refers to Contract Disputes Act cases.  The 
Government urges that the reference to a specific exception, 
i.e., “chapter 71 of title 41,” means that no other exceptions 
apply and that “every civil action” means exactly what it says.  
The Government also notes that, although § 2401(a) predates 
Title VII, Congress amended 2401(a) to add the Contract 
Disputes Act exception in 1978, after Title VII was enacted, 
and it did not add any explicit exception for Title VII.  See 
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 14(b), 
92 Stat. 2383, 2389 (“Section 2401(a) . . . is amended by 
striking out ‘Every’ at the beginning and inserting in lieu 
thereof ‘Except as provided by the Contract Disputes Act of 
1978, every’.”).   
 
 This argument lacks merit, however, because, 
notwithstanding the “every civil action” language of Title 
VII, § 2401(a) does not always apply.  For example, it does 
not apply to tax refund suits.  Bruno, 547 F.2d at 74.  Nor 
does it apply to Quiet Title Act (“QTA”) suits.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2409a(g) (“Any civil action under this section . . . shall be 
barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date 
upon which it accrued.”); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 
38, 41-42 (1998) (“The QTA includes a 12-year statute of 
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limitations . . . .”).  Therefore, other statutes of limitations 
govern certain civil actions against the United States, even 
though those statutes of limitations are not specifically 
excepted in § 2401(a) itself.  Title VII is just another example 
of this.  
 
 Section 2401(a) is meant to apply when other 
limitations periods are lacking, which is certainly not the case 
here.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied 
§ 2401(a) to a case under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) because “[i]n the absence of a specific statutory 
limitations period, a civil action against the United States 
under the APA is subject to the six year limitations period 
found in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).”  Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 
1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352, 359 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(describing § 2401(a) as “a catch-all provision; it establishes a 
general limitations period for civil lawsuits against the United 
States not otherwise covered by a more specific limitations 
period.”); Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 
1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Neither the Public Land Orders 
nor the [APA] contain a specific statute of limitations; thus, 
the general civil action statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(a), applies.”).  In sum, courts apply § 2401(a) where 
there is no separate limitations period in the statute; by 
contrast, Title VII specifically provides that a claimant may 
file suit after 180 days “until such time” as there is a final 
decision.  Section 2401(a)’s general limitation must yield to 
Title VII’s specific regime.   
 
 Third, the Government argues that there must be 
“some outer limit” to the time period in which Kannikal can 
come to federal court, that § 2401(a) is the applicable outer 
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limit, and that only shorter, but not longer, limitations periods 
are permissible.  It is true that some cases have referred to 
§ 2401(a) as an outer limit.  See, e.g., Price v. Bernanke, 470 
F.3d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[Section] 2401(a) sets an 
outside time limit . . . .”); Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 
1026 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[Section] 2401(a) is a general statute of 
limitations setting an outside time limit on suits against the 
United States.”).  However, it is not always the outer limit.  
We need only reference the QTA to prove the point: it allows 
a longer limitations period than § 2401(a) provides, i.e., 
twelve years instead of six.  We agree that there must be an 
outer limit for Title VII actions, but that limit is not contained 
in § 2401(a).  Rather, the limit is tied to the final agency 
action.     
 
 In Occidental, the Supreme Court specifically rejected 
the notion that a time limitation not clearly set forth in Title 
VII could apply to limit the EEOC’s right to file enforcement 
suits on behalf of private claimants.  The employer argued 
that, if Title VII did not limit the time during which the 
EEOC could bring enforcement suits, then the most 
analogous state statute of limitations should apply.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that “Congress 
did express concern for the need of time limitations in the fair 
operation of [Title VII], but that concern was directed entirely 
to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and prompt 
notification thereafter to the alleged violator.”  Occidental, 
432 U.S. at 371.  It emphasized that “[n]othing in [Title VII] 
indicates that EEOC enforcement powers cease if the 
complainant decides to leave the case in the hands of the 
EEOC rather than to pursue a private action.”  Id. at 361.  The 
absence of an outer limit defined in years is consistent with 
Title VII’s overall scheme: “that the only statute of 
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limitations discussions in Congress were directed to the 
period preceding the filing of an initial charge is wholly 
consistent with [Title VII]’s overall enforcement structure” 
because “[w]ithin this procedural framework, the benchmark, 
for purposes of a statute of limitations, is not the last phase of 
the multistage scheme, but the commencement of the 
proceeding before the administrative body.”  Id. at 372.  Title 
VII’s scheme emphasizes a claimant’s initial steps and 
preserves the claimant’s options.  It does not concern itself 
with an outer limitation defined in years. 
 
 The Government’s concern for an outer limit is all the 
more perplexing when we consider that this limit is totally 
within its control.  Once the agency issues a final decision, 
the limitation period is quite short, only 90 days.  Any lengthy 
delays are therefore attributable to the Government.  It would 
be unreasonable to hold that the Government’s own delays 
can protect it from Title VII lawsuits.  The Government also 
asserts that § 2401(a) remedies the problem of claimants who 
fail to participate in the administrative process or fail to 
prosecute their claims.  This, too, is unpersuasive.  Other 
remedies, such as laches or dismissal for failure to prosecute, 
exist when a claimant fails to pursue his claims.  We need not 
penalize all claimants who suffer EEOC delays merely to 
target those who have not been diligent.   
 
 In sum, we hold that § 2401(a) does not apply to Title 
VII actions.  Section 2000e-16(c) allows a claimant to escape 
the administrative process anytime “until such time” as there 
is a final decision.  Title VII has a specific, comprehensive 
scheme, and specific schemes trump general statutes.  
Congress intended that the Title VII scheme would be 
preemptive.  The absence of outer limits on the administrative 
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process is consistent with that scheme, particularly because 
Congress intended to prioritize claimants’ rights, despite 
EEOC delays, by providing an escape hatch.  Moreover, 
§ 2401(a) does not apply to “every civil action,” particularly 
when there is a specific structure of deadlines.  And, finally, 
applying § 2401(a) would undermine the administrative 
process, which Congress intended to be the primary 
mechanism for addressing discrimination complaints.7 
IV. The LCSA Does Not Apply 
 The Government also argues that Kannikal’s signing 
of a Last Chance Settlement Agreement (“LCSA”) bars this 
action because the Bureau of Prisons agreed to postpone his 
termination and provide him improvement opportunities in 
exchange for his waiver of his appeal rights.8  We disagree 
with the Government’s interpretation of the LCSA.   
 
 The LCSA provides that Kannikal “agrees . . . to waive 
any and all appeal and grievance rights, relating to the 
underlying charges proposed in this matter on February 2, 
1999, including, but not limited to, the Merit Systems 
Protection Board, Equal Employment Opportunity 
                                              
7 Because we hold that § 2401(a) does not apply, we do not 
address whether § 2401(a) is subject to equitable tolling, 
which is the primary issue that the parties raised on appeal.   
8 The District Court did not address this argument because it 
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under § 2401(a).  
We consider it here because § 2401(a) does not apply, the 
parties briefed the issue, and the LCSA is in the record.   
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Commission . . . for a period ending June 2, 2000.”  (J.A. 22.)  
The LCSA’s plain language shows that Kannikal’s waiver 
applied only until June 2, 2000.  He filed his complaint with 
the EEOC on April 20, 2001, and, thus, the LCSA does not 
apply.  
  
 At oral argument, the Government argued that the June 
2, 2000 date meant that Kannikal could never appeal 
discriminatory behavior relating to the termination in this 
case, but he could challenge future discriminatory behavior 
occurring after June 2, 2000.  In other words, the Government 
argued that the June 2, 2000 date was intended to show that 
Kannikal was not waiving his rights to challenge future 
discrimination, but was permanently waiving his rights to 
appeal the proposed termination.  This argument contradicts 
the LCSA’s plain language, which states that Kannikal 
“agrees . . . to waive any and all appeal and grievance rights, 
relating to the underlying charges . . . for a period ending 
June 2, 2000.”  (J.A. 22 (emphasis added).)  The LCSA 
specifically states that the June 2, 2000 date applies to appeals 
“relating to the underlying charges,” not to future 
discriminatory behavior.  The Government’s interpretation 
contradicts the LCSA’s plain and clear language, and that 
language is dispositive.  See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote 
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]e interpret documents in accord with their plain 
language.”).   
 
 The Government also argues that res judicata bars 
Kannikal from pursuing this appeal.  On September 30, 1999, 
Kannikal appealed his termination to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (“MSPB”).  He appealed to the MSPB 
before June 2, 2000, i.e., during the time period in which the 
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LCSA prohibited him from appealing.  The MSPB held that 
the LCSA barred his appeal.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit upheld this decision, holding that “this court 
detects no error in the Board’s conclusion that it lacked 
jurisdiction.”  Kannikal v. Dep’t of Justice, 25 F. App’x 874, 
877 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Res judicata does not bar Kannikal 
from pursuing the instant action because he filed his EEOC 
appeal after the LCSA waiver expired and because the MSPB 
only addressed the LCSA, not the merits of Kannikal’s 
termination claim.9  
 
 In short, the LCSA does not apply after June 2, 2000.  
Kannikal filed his EEOC charge on April 20, 2001.  Neither 
the LCSA nor the Federal Circuit decision bars this suit. 
V. Conclusion 
 Section 2401(a) does not apply to Title VII actions.  
Kannikal was terminated in 1999 and has sought relief for 
over a decade.  While we offer no opinion regarding the 
merits of his case, we do conclude that § 2401(a) and the 
LCSA do not preclude this suit.  We will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this Opinion.   
                                              
9 Appellee also argues that Kannikal is collaterally estopped 
from challenging the LCSA’s validity.  We need not reach 
that issue because the LCSA does not apply, and so its 
validity is irrelevant. 
